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McIntosh: Real Property

Real Property
by Harold E. McIntosh*
Introduction

Many cases were decided in the field of real property during
the period covered by the survey, but very few of them were
decided in the California Supreme Court. There is one case
of special importance that was decided in the Appellate Department of the Superior Court. Only those cases thought to
be of special significance are included in this survey, and
legislation enacted during the period will not be discussed.
Deeds
Mecchi v. Picchi l is a case presenting a question concerning

delivery of deeds. A father manually delivered two deeds
to his daughters by a previous marriage, and· requested that
* A.B. 1943, Colorado State College
of Education; J.D. 1948, University of
San Francisco. Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. Member, California State Bar.

1. 245 Cal. App.2d 470, 54 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1966).
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they not be recorded until after his death. In each deed,
the father reserved a life estate and referred to an affidavit
executed contemporaneously with the deeds, which recited
the motivation for the execution of the deeds. 2 Subsequently,
the father executed and recorded another deed to a portion
of the same property, naming himself and his second wife
as joint tenants. After the death of the father, the daughters
recorded their deeds and brought an action to quiet title.
At the trial, the daughters sought to introduce the affidavit
into evidence, but, upon objection by the surviving spouse,
the proffered evidence was rejected. The Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the affidavit should have been admitted
because it was, in essence, incorporated into the deeds. The
court noted that under provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,3 verbal or written acts of the immediate grantor are admissible to prove that the transfer was absolute or that the
grantee took the deed subject to conditions. The court then
determined that the affidavit and other evidence were sufficient
to overcome the inference of nondelivery arising from evidence that (a) the deeds were not recorded until after the
grantor's death, (b) the grantor retained possession of the
property, (c) the grantor paid the taxes, and (d) another deed
was subsequently executed by him in an attempt to convey
the property again.
An interesting situation arose which for the first time called
for the construction of certain statutes that seek to protect the
health and welfare of aged persons in California when they
enter into a contract for lifetime care. 4 In Stenger v. Ander2. 245 Cal. App.2d at 477, n. 3: "The
recitals read: 'I am doing this to clear
my conscience, and to right a wrong
which I have committed. My first wife,
Domenica Picchi, died leaving a will
which left all properties to me for my
life and then to my two daughters above
named, upon my death. I destroyed
that will and testified in the Superior
Court of San Mateo County . . .
that I could not find a will and did not
know of the existence of a will for
Domenica Picchi. This was untrue and
148
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I knew it to be untrue when I so testified, but I was not well at the time
and my present wife, Maria Picchi,
made me do it.'''
3. See former Cal. Code. Civ. Proc.
§§ 1850, 1870, providing for admissibility of acts or declarations which are a
part of a transaction.
4. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § § 23002360. In 1965, these sections were renumbered (Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1784,
§ 5) and now appear as §§ 16200 to
16318. This legislation was designed
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son,s an 86-year-old widow transferred property to another, in
exchange for a promise to care for her for the remainder of her
life. She then had second thoughts and brought an action to
rescind the contract, which was granted by the trial court and
affirmed on appeal to the California Supreme Court. The
California Supreme Court based its decision on § 16300 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, which requires the person
furnishing the life care to obtain a license. Former case law
and statutes had held that the license was necessary only for
institutional care, but the court gave credence to legislative
policy that recognizes the unequal status of the parties and the
vulnerability of the aged to exploitation, and found this contract within the purview of legislative intent. Failure to comply with the statutory requirements therefore rendered the
contract invalid.
Lundgren v. Lundgren, 6 which involved the problem of
priority, the court had to determine who held title where a
mother had executed two deeds: the first, a quitclaim deed
to a daughter; the second, a deed to a son. The daughter
claimed that the son had given no consideration and thus could
not a bona fide purchaser. The court said that the circumstances existing at the time of a transfer determine if the
consideration is fair and adequate. Although the son paid a
token price, he made repairs and permitted the mother to
reside there. The property was so dilapidated that it could
not be rented; the mother was unable to pay the taxes on the
property. The consideration was held to be adequate even
though the repairs and improvements were made after the
giving of the deed. At no time did the son know of the prior
deed.
The daughter argued that to allow the son to prevail would
be an unjust enrichment because the property had improved
in value. The court held that the daughter was guilty of
laches. She knew that the son was making repairs and imto prevent the infliction of harm to the
elderly by those who are not fully qualified to care for them under proper
conditions and on reasonable terms.

5. 66 Cal.2d 970, 59 Cal. Rptr. 844,
429 P.2d 164 (1967).
6. 245 Cal. App.2d 582, 54 Cal. Rptr.
30 (1966).
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provements upon the property and took no steps to assert
her claim for about 3t years. Title was quieted in the son.

Descriptions
Three cases decided by the Court of Appeal involved problems of description. In Saunders v. Polich,7 the court merely
stated the general rule that a subsequent survey must be made
from record of the federal government survey, and that the
last federal survey is conclusive as a matter of law. In the
absence of a comparison of the Department of Highways'
field notes to those of the official survey, the state survey is
insufficien t.
Hixson v. Jones s presented a unique problem in land description. The title company identified a parcel by plot map
and then, without the consent of the parties, proceeded to
describe the property by metes and bounds. The metes and
bounds description called for the property boundary to run
to the line of Third Street and then to run parallel with the
line of the street. The street had been abandoned by the
city, and Hixson brought a quiet title action against the city
and claimed ownership to the center of the street. Section
1112 of the Civil Code creates a statutory rebuttable presumption that a transfer of land, bounded by a street, passes
title to the center of the street. The court was therefore confronted with the problem of determining whether the metes
and bounds description rebuts the statutory presumption.
The trial court held, in accordance with prior California law,
that a metes and bounds description controls, and is an effective rebuttal of the statutory presumption. However, the
Court of Appeal reversed and stated that the statutory presumption may be rebutted by the use of the metes and bounds
description only if the metes and bounds description was inserted in the exercise of free choice by the grantor. Since the
description was inserted to compensate for the vagueness of
the plot map description and not at the request of the parties,
it would seem that unless there is evidence that a different
7. 250 Cal. App.2d 136, 58 Cal Rptr.
198 (1967).
150
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883 (1967).
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result was intended, a metes and bounds description does
not overcome the statutory presumption that property lines
extend to the center of the street.
Another description problem concerning ownership to the
center of a street arose in Murray v. Title Insurance and Trust
Co. 9 A deed had been drafted incorporating a reference to
a plot map that showed that the street had been vacated of
record. The problem raised was whether the title insurer
was liable, as the policy did not cover the property to the
center of the vacated street. The court considered a number
of different problems arising from a conveyance with reference
to a plot map and the problem of street vacation. It listed
and discussed four types of conveyances that a grantor may
make to a grantee. lO It concluded that, as between grantor
and grantee, if the grantor did, in fact, own to the center
of the street, the grantee would take, although the recorded
map showed the street as abandoned.
Landlord and Tenant
Two landlord and tenant cases deserve mentioning.
Weisberg v. Loughridge ll involved a lease in which the tenant
(T) was given the right to remove improvements and trade
fixtures. T placed the improvements upon the leased
premises. He later assigned the lease. The assignee (A)
agreed to purchase the improvements, and gave T a chattel
mortgage as security for the unpaid portion of the improvements. Later, A subleased the premises to the defendant (S),
who did not assume personal1iability for the payment of the
chattel mortgage. T then brought a foreclosure action against
the property after default in payment of the chattel mort9. 250 Cal. App.2d 248, 58 Cal. Rptr.
273 (1967).
10. The court considered "implications of coverage under four different
types of conveyances: (1) a conveyance
of property by reference to a map which
shows a bounding street; (2) a conveyance by reference to a map which
shows a bounding street, abandoned in
fact but not of record; (3) a conveyance

by reference to a map which shows a
bounding street abandoned of record,
when the grantor owns the property-inchief and the bounding strip and (4) the
previous situation, when the properties
are under separate ownership." (250
Cal. App.2d at 252, 58 Cal. Rptr. at
276.)
11. 253 Cal. App.2d 472, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 563 (1967).
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gage. Shortly after the institution of the action, A and the
landlord (L) agreed to a surrender of the leasehold estate.
Surrender was not known to plaintiff. Land S, then entered
into a lease of the premises. After the foreclosure action resulted in a purchase by T, the defendant refused possession
to remove the improvements.
In the instant action brought by T to establish ownership,
S relied on the principle that articles attached to the land
belong to the owner after a lease comes to an end, and
he therefore argued that the articles sought to be possessed
belonged to the lessor and were part of the property leased
to lessee. The court held that this is a general rule, but
that it was not applicable here. The lessor had disclaimed any
rights to the articles, and the court held that the rule was
primarily for the benefit of a landlord. Here, the lease had
come to an end by surrender. The rule between landlord
and tenant is that a tenant should have a reasonable time to
remove. This rule should operate in the same manner in
favor of the mortgagee. The defendant also claimed title to
the articles as the purchaser under a tax foreclosure proceeding
against the improvements. The court dismissed this claim
because defendant was under a legal duty to pay the taxes.
Purchase by one who has a duty to pay nullifies the sale, and
therefore, title was in the plaintiff.
The other case, Buckner v. Azuli,12 represents a trend that
affords more protection to tenants. The case, decided in the
appellate department of the Superior Court of California, was
an action for damages against a landlord. Contending that
a constructive eviction had occurred when the leased premises
became infested with vermin, the plaintiff prevailed in the
trial court. The landlord appealed, claiming that the tenant
had no cause of action because, in the lease, he had waived
the statutory duty imposed by Civil Code § 1941/3 and that
12. 251 Cal. App.2d Supp 1013, 59
Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967).
13. Cal. Civ. Code § 1941. Lessor
to make dwelling house fit for its purpose. The lessor of a building intended
for the occupation of human beings
152
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to the contrary, put it into a condition
fit for such occupation, and repair all
subsequent dilapidations thereof, which
render it untenantable, except such as
are mentioned in section nineteen hun-
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therefore the common-law rule controlled. The Appellate
Department of the Superior Court refused to recognize this
claim, holding that a provision for waiver of Civil Code
§ 1941 must be strictly construed. It further found that the
waiver in the written lease pertained only to one part of the
premises and was therefore not material to the action because
vermin infested the entire building. The court stated that
even if the waiver were applicable, it would be invalid because
it was against the public policy, as reflected by the housing
regulations I4 that require the landlord to keep the premises
free from vermin.
Cotenancy

Several cases involving cotenancy deserve mention. The
age-old problem of disagreement among cotenants leading
to partition forms the basis for Felder v. Felder. 15 Parties
involved owned 15/32, 1116, and 15/32 interests in the subject property. In the partition action, the parties stipulated
that the property could be partitioned in kind, and they
provided the general basis for determining the boundaries for
the respective parts. The appellant contended that as a
result of the survey conducted incident to the partition, the
stipulated partition should be void because of mutual mistake
of fact. The allegations of mistake and uncertainty arose
when the parties discovered, after the survey, that the tract
did not contain as many acres as they thought. The court
held that the mutual mistake was immaterial where the mistake had been compensated for by a proportionate downward
adjustment of acreage allotted to each. The division was
fair and equitable as the two parcels represented approximately equal values. Moreover, the court said that the division followed the stipulation of the parties except for the
reduction in acreage.
dred and twenty-nine. (Enacted 1872.
As amended Code Am. 1873-74, c. 612,
p. 245, § 205.)
14. 8 Admin. Code § 17906. See also
Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App.2d

482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966); Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d
409 (1961).
15. 247 Cal. App.2d 718, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 780 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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Heber v. Yaeger16 represented a longstanding controversy
between two cotenants. Each party held a life estate with
the remainder interest owned by defendant, who was also in
possession. The plaintiff sued for partition and an accounting, and the defendant was granted a summary judgment by
the trial court. The Court of Appeal reversed on the grounds
that there were triable issues of fact, such as the fact that
a prior judgment in 1944 had provided for the means of accounting between the parties, and that the plaintiff argued
noncompliance with that agreement. Furthermore, as a result of an action pending in 1958, an agreement between
plaintiff and defendant was entered into whereby the plaintiff
promised to waive any future income from one of the three
properties as long as it was operated as a citrus ranch, if the
plaintiff would not be charged any portion of the cost or expense of its operation during the period. The defendant contended on trial that this agreement constituted a waiver of the
right to partition during the lifetime of plaintiff, rather than
only during the time the property was operated as a citrus
ranch, as indicated in the agreement. The court stated that
the right to partition is absolute unless limited by agreement,
express or implied. Here, the court could find no such waiver
from the agreement although the right to profits was therein
expressly waived. The court also held that the right to accounting provisions contained in the 1944 agreement was
not affected by the waiver, since the waiver pertained only to
the citrus property and not to the other two parcels of property
owned by the parties.
The defense of adverse possession was raised in Russell
v. Lescalet/7 an action for partition. The defendants, a
husband and wife, had owned the property in joint tenancy.
Prior to acquisition of the property by plaintiff, a predecessor
in title of the plaintiff had acquired the wife's interest by a
sheriff's deed issued under a writ of execution. The defendants remained in possession of the property, paying taxes
and otherwise treating it as their own. The court followed
16. 251 Cal. App.2d 258, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 353 (1967).
154
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the general rule that if the tenant in possession does nothing
more than occupy the premises, his possession is not adverse
to the cotenant out of possession; the latter must have notice,
actual or constructive, that the former's possession is hostile
to him. Under the facts of this case, since the possession of
the wife, who had no interest in the property, could not be
considered separate and apart from that of her husband,
the court held that no title by adverse possession could be
acquired.
In Moore v. Hall,18 the property in question had been owned
in common by the judgment debtor husband and his wife.
Plaintiff was the judgment creditor of the husband and, after
levy and sale, became the purchaser of the property for $100.
After the purchase by the plaintiff and before the time f()r
redemption had expired, the husband conveyed his interest
in the property to his wife. She thereafter redeemed the property from the sale. The plaintiff then proceeded to levy
against the property a second time. This levy led to a second
sale to the plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a quiet title action.
The court made the distinction between a redemption by
the judgment debtor, which revives the lien of the creditor,
and the redemption by a successor in interest, which terminates
the lien. The plaintiff further argued that although this is
true, the purchase by the wife of the judgment debtor was
nevertheless a fraud upon creditors. The court said that
one of the primary purposes of statutory redemption is to
force the purchaser at the execution sale to bid on the property at a price approximating its fair value. There was no
showing that the $100 paid by the plaintiff met this test.
Title was quieted in defendants.
Subjacent and Lateral Support
Marin Municipal Water District v. Northwestern Pacific
Railroad Compani 9 is a case that the court calls one with
no precedent in California and one that is a pure subjacent
support case. Plaintiff's water mains were on the surface
18. 250 Cal. App.2d 25, 58 Cal. Rptr.
70 (1967).
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of property, under which, at some time in the past, a railroad
tunnel had been constructed. The tunnel collapsed causing
damage to plaintiff's mains. The complaint alleged that the
common-law rule of absolute liability applied and that the
railroad was liable. The court stated:
At common law, where one person owns the surface
of land and another the subjacent land, the owner of the
surface is entitled to have it remain in its natural condition, without subsidence by reason of the subsurface
owner's withdrawal of subjacent support. . . . The
same authorities agree that the common-law right of subjacent support is closely analogous to that of lateral
suport.
Under all the authorities, also, the
common-law obligation of subjacent support is "absolute" [and] the common-law obligation of lateral support
is similarly "absolute."2o
The court then distinguished the two obligations by saying
that support is lateral where the supported land and the supporting lands are divided by a vertical plane; support is subjacent where the supported land is above and the supporting
land is beneath it.
The water district contended that the common-law rule of
absolute liability for deprivation of subjacent support is still
law in California. The railroad asserted that the legislature
changed the rule by enactment of Civil Code § 832. The
court held that Civil Code § 832 applied only to coterminous
surface landowners; five reasons for this limitation were given:
( 1) Civil Code § 832 frees an owner from absolute liability
for lateral support. (2) Civil Code § 832 declares entitlement of a coterminous owner to support from adjoining land.
Both "coterminous" and "adjoining" import a common
boundary, but "coterminous" denotes the same or coincident
boundary while "adjoining" denotes touching or contiguous.
On the surface of the land, it is feasible that such a boundary
can be drawn. This relationship cannot be drawn between
surface and subsurface ownerships. Thus, by the use of
20. 253 Cal. App.2d at 87, 61 Cal.
Rptr. at 524.
156
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"coterminous" and "adjoining" in Civil Code § 832, the statute is limited to surface ownerships. (3) Civil Code § 832
also applies to excavations on, and not underneath, the land.
Again, this applies to surface owners only. (4) Section 832
is found in the division of the Civil Code entitled "Boundaries." Boundaries are characteristic of surface ownership of
land, and other sections in that division of the code refer to
surface owners. (5) Subjacent support applies mostly to mining cases. California legislative history shows that surface
protection statutes were part of the early code but were not
included in Civil Code § 832, and that the mining statute
was finally abolished in 1933 as obsolete.
The railroad then contended that the common-law .ru1e
applies to land in its natural condition, and thus does not
protect the mains because they are structures. The court
stated that this is generally true, but that the authorities and
cases on the point say the right is not lost unless the downward
pressure of the weight of the structures contributed to the
subsidence. The burden to show this is on the railroad and
is a matter of affirmative defense and proof. Thus, California follows the absolute liability doctrine with regard to
subjacent support, and has a pure subjacent-support case as
authority.
An enjoyable footnote to the fifth reason listed above is
purely historical.
The 1871 [Code] commission itself was unquestionably
versed in the problems of subjacent support of land in
mining operations. Charles Lindley, one of its three
members, was a pioneer mining lawyer in California and
Nevada. Curtis H. Lindley, his son and later the author
of Lindley on Mines, became the commission's secretary
in early 1872. History's full circle may be closed with
the note that one of the younger Lindley's notable accomplishments in later life was the organization of the Marin
Municipal Water District, appellant herein. (Colby,
Curtis Holbrook Lindley (1850-1920) 9 Ca1.L.Rev.
87.)1
1. 253 Cal. App.2d at 94, 61 Cal.
Rptr. at 548.
CAL LAW Hl67
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California is a big state, with a large population. It appears
that the problems involved in financing real estate transactions constitute one of the largest areas of litigation, and the
cases are diverse. Some are good cases, some are bad, and
some merely reinforce the factor of bigness.
Jones v. Sacramento Savings and Loan Association 2 is perhaps an outstanding example of the problem. Thirteen lots
were sold. Purchase-money deeds of trust provided that they
would be subordinated to construction loans under certain
conditions. Defendant made loans under these provisions.
Notes on both purchase-money security and constructionloan security were defaulted. The beneficiary under purchasemoney notes caused notice of default and sale to take place
on six of the lots involved. The beneficiary under the construction-money notes caused notice of default to be given and sale
to take place on eleven of the lots involved, six of which had
already been sold under the first sale. The plaintiff was a
purchaser under purchase-money notes and sued to quiet title.
The court held that provisions for subordination under purchase-money notes were not complied with, and that the
defendant did not acquire any interest that was superior to
that of plaintiff as a result of the sales. Thus, as to the sales
made by the plaintiff, the interest of the defendant was terminated. As to the sales that the defendant made, the interest
of the plaintiff was unaffected. However, the court did go
on to grant the defendant's request that an equitable lien
be asserted against the plaintiff's interest in the property on
the basis of unjust enrichment. A general doctrine of equity
permits imposition of an equitable lien where the claimant's
expenditure has benefited another's property under circumstances entitling the claimant to restitution. A specific application of the doctrine occurs when a lender advances money
that benefits the land of another in mistaken reliance upon
an imperfect mortgage or lien upon that land.
2. 248 Cal. App.2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr.
741 (1967). For a more exhaustive dis158
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One would have to say that the case is remarkable for its
result. Perhaps the court was influenced by the fact that the
purchase-money notes were for about $800 for each lot,
purchased before sale by plaintiff at a discount, whereas the
construction loans were for approximately $12,000 for each
lot. It seems that the unjust enrichment rule should not apply
here. 3 The lender knew that the property was subject to
purchase-money notes that had provisions for subordination.
According to facts presented to the court, when the lender
issued escrow instructions asking for subordination to be secured, the title company involved refused to issue insurance
covering the deeds unless it received additional subordination
agreements from the trustee of the purchase-money trust deeds.
The defendant then withdrew the escrow, and another title
company became the escrow depositary. At this point, the
defendant seems to have been proceeding at its own risk.
Later, when the sales of the property were to take place,
there was no attempt by the defendant to reinstate or to
challenge the sale made by the purchase-money beneficiary.
Perhaps the fact that Jones was not the original holder of
the purchase-money notes might have made a difference.
The court stated that when Jones bought the notes, he knew
that the property was being improved as a result of the
construction loans. However, the court found that that fact
did nothing except raise the equity in the defendant. The
question is: How far will this case go as precedent in other
cases where the lender acts this recklessly, but yet wishes to
be protected against its own actions?
Another application of the problem of subordination arose
in Pollack v. Tiano. 4 A vendor entered into an agreement
to sell property and to subordinate the vendor's security interest in the property to a construction lender's lien. The construction loan did not comply with the terms of the subordination agreement, and the vendor refused to execute the
subordination papers. At this point, the lender refused to
3. Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 184, 22
P.2d 694 (1933); Smith v. AngloCalifornia Trust Co., Beckwith v.
Sheldon, 168 Cal. at 746-47, 145 P. at

99 (1914); and see 17 CAL. L. REV.
412.
4. 253 Cal. App.2d 221, 61 Cal. Rptr.
235 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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make the loan, and the purchaser refused to make the down
payment as agreed. The purchaser then brought an action
for specific performance of the contract to sell and in the
alternative for damages. The vendor filed a cross complaint
for damages for failure to perform the agreement. The court
awarded the vendor damages on the cross complaint and
denied recovery to plaintiff. The case is an example of the
problems that can arise when property is purchased with a
small down payment and financing is obtained upon the
vendor's agreement to subordinate his security interest. The
failure in this. case is that the purchaser wanted to use a
portion of the construction loan to pay for the property,
which was clearly not within the terms of the agreement.
Other cases in this area involve anti deficiency problems.
Powell v. Alber5 was concerned with a land sale contract
which provided that upon default by the purchaser, the entire
purchase price would become due, or the purchaser would
forfeit the contract and execute a quitclaim of all his rights,
title, and interest in the property to the vendor. The court
stated that these provisions were merely attempts to waive
the anti deficiency provisions contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure,6 and that such waivers are contrary to public policy
and unenforceable.
Another waiver attempt was made in Loretz v. Cal-Coast
Development Corporation. 7 The note used to purchase property was secured by a deed of trust on property other than
that being purchased. The note also provided for an agreed
valuation of the security property. Upon default, the security
property was sold for an amount less than the agreed valuation. The holder of the note sued for the difference, claiming
that the extent of the value stated over the price received
at the trustee's sale was equivalent to a second unsecured
note. The court held that the agreed valuation provision
was tantamount to a waiver of the antideficiency statute and
therefore void as against public policy.
5. 250 Cal. App.2d 485, 58 Cal. Rptr.
657 (1967).
6. Cal. Code Civ. Proe. § 580d.
160
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However, in Jonathan Manor, Inc. v. Artisan, Inc. s and
Van Vleck Realty v. Gaunt,9 unsecured notes were sued upon
by the holders, who prevailed over the attempted application
of the antideficiency defense. The result seems correct in
Jonathan, since the holder specifically provided in the escrow
agreement that the notes were to be unsecured; subsequent
transfers of three of the notes made it clear that those three
were the only notes to be secured. The holder sued on a
remaining unsecured note. Although the note had been given
for a portion of the purchase price, it did not run afoul of the
antideficiency legislation since it was not secured by a deed
of trust or mortgage.
The Van Vleck Realty case is not so clear. The trial court
found that the note was unsecured as a matter of fact, but,
relying on Bargioni v. Hill,lO concluded that as a matter of
law the note was part of the obligation secured by a second
deed of trust and that it was barred by § 580b of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The appellate court reversed, holding
that the case is controlled by Roseleat Corp. v. Chierighino,ll
which pointed out that § 580b discourages overvaluation by
placing the risk of inadequate security on the purchase-money
mortgagee, and that this purpose is achieved only if the statutory limitation applies exclusively to security transactions.
The court also cited Jonathan as authority for holding that
a note given for the purchase price of property comes under
the antideficiency statutes only when a security device is used.
In Baumrucker v. American Mortgage Exchange, Inc.,12
the plaintiff bought from the defendant notes secured by
deeds of trust. After default and purchase by the plaintiff,
one piece of the property was sold for a sum much less than
the value of the notes, and he found the other property to
be unmarketable. He thereupon sued defendant for damages,
including money spent to make the property suitable for rent8. 247 Ca1. App.2d 651, 56 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1967).
'
9. 250 Cal. App.2d 81, 58 Cal. Rptr.
246 (1967).
10. 59 Ca1.2d 121, 28 Ca1. Rptr. 321,
378 P.2d 593 (1963).
II
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11. 59 Ca1.2d 35, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873,
378 P.2d 97 (1963).
12. 250 Cal. App.2d 451, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 677 (1967).
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ing. The defendant demurred, contending that the suit was
merely an action for a deficiency judgment following the sale
of the property under the deed of trust. Numerous violations
of the Real Property Securities Dealer Law were alleged as
a basis for the complaint. 13 In overriding the demurrer
sustained by the lower court on a pleading of § 580d of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate court held that
an action under the statute is not an action for a deficiency
judgment, and therefore Code of Civil Procedure § 580d does
not apply.
A case with interesting procedure is Lee v. Ski Run Apartments,14 wherein the plaintiff asserted a right to rents pledged
in a deed of trust of which plaintiffs were the beneficiaries.
The defendant had defaulted the senior encumbrance, which
also constituted a default of the terms of the plaintiff's deed
of trust. Judgment was given for the plaintiff for a sum of
money not prayed for in the complaint. The defendant appealed on the basis that a default judgment is void and may
be appealed when the relief granted by the judgment is greater
than that asked for in the complaint. Is In its decision the
court stated the general rule that a trustor in possession of
the property is entitled to the rents and profits, and that absent
an actual assignment of rents and profits, the beneficiary has
only a security interest. Otherwise, a beneficiary must actually acquire lawful possession by consent or lawful procedure,
or must secure the appointment of a receiver in order to perfect
his claim to the rents. The court reversed on the rule that
a money judgment not prayed for was beyond the jurisdictional limits of the court, but remanded the case for a
decision on the question of receivership.
An action to enjoin a bank from selling property in default
of payment by the purchaser was denied in Kemple v. Security
First National Bank of Los Angeles. I6 The federal statute
provides that "no attachment, injunction, or execution shall
be issued against [a national banking association] or its prop13. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 1023710238.7.
14. 249 Cal. App.2d 298, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 496 (1967).
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16. 249 Cal. App.2d 719, 57 Cal.
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erty before final judgment in any suit [or] action . . . in
any State . . . court.,,17 In rejecting appellant's argument
that the statute applied only when a national banking association's efficiency would be impaired, the court cited and
quoted from a recent case ruling that had settled the issue
adversely to appellant. 1s Thus the Superior Court below did
not have jurisdiction to grant a preliminary injunction.
In the absence of provisions to the contrary, insurance proceeds payable to a beneficiary of a deed of trust operate to
reduce the debt pro tanto, and the beneficiary is not required
to apply the proceeds to any particular instalment of the
note. Therefore, even though the proceeds of the insurance
are paid to the beneficiary, if the trustor does not thereafter
make payments according to the terms of the note, the beneficiary may give notice of default and proceed with sale of the
property under power of sale. So held Lee v. Murphy.19
The insurance clause contained in the trust deed was the
typical provision found in most deeds of trust, which permits
the proceeds to apply to the indebtedness secured and in such
order as the beneficiary may determine. The court held that
this provision as to order applies where there is more than
one indebtedness, but where there is only one debt, the pro
tanto rule applies.
Vendor and Purchaser
Closely related to the problems of security discussed above
is the problem of liquidated damages in a contract to sell.
In Greenbach Bros., Inc. v. Burns,20 the vendor sought to
recover the deposit made into escrow. After judgment for
the vendor, court granted vendee's motion for a new trial.
On appeal the court held that the amount deposited in escrow
had no bearing on the damages and did not satisfy the provision of Civil Code § 1671 that liquidated damages are allowable where damages are impractical or impossible to ascertain.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 91.
18. See First Nat'!. Bank v. Superior
Court, 240 Cal. App.2d 109, 49 Cal.
Rptr 358, cert. denied 385 U.S. 829, 17
L.Ed.2d 65, 87 S.Ct. 65 (1966).

19.
Rptr.
20.
Rptr.

253 Cal. App.2d 244, 61 Cal.
174 (1967).
245 Cal. App.2d 767, 54 Cal.
143 (1966).
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The fact that the purchaser asked for additional time in which
to secure financing, and as a condition of this, he was required
to deposit an additional sum into escrow, aided the court in
finding that the deposits were purely arbitrary.
Other vendor-purchaser problems arise when dealing with
escrows. Two cases 1 stand for the proposition that once the
escrow instructions satisfy the statute of frauds requirements,
it is possible to introduce parol evidence as to the actual agreement between the parties. The purpose of an escrow is to
carry out an agreement of sale; an escrow does not supplant
the basic agreement.
Easement Problems
In Pettis v. General Telephone Company,S the plaintiff
sought to quiet title to his property as against utility easements
of the defendants. Prior to its acquisition by the plaintiff,
the property had been condemned by the state to build a
freeway. The utility companies involved were requested to
relocate the utilities, and did so. Later, it was determined
that the property was excess property, and the state deeded
the property to the predecessor of plaintiff. There was no
mention of the location of the utilities in the deed given by
the state or in the deed to plaintiff. At the trial of the action,
the utility companies said that action was without merit as
to them, and moved for a summary judgment under Code
of Civil Procedure § 437c. The motion was granted and,
upon appeal, reversed. The court held that the motion was
not proper upon affidavits, given both in support of and in
opposition to the motion, if there was any triable issue of
fact. Therefore, the question was whether plaintiff, as he
alleged, was without notice of the easements when he purchased. If he was such a purchaser, his rights were prior to
that of the utility companies. In such a case, then, the utility
companies would be able to show that the public use of the
1. Goodman v. Community Savings
& Loan Ass'n., 246 Cal. App.2d 13, 54

2. 66 Cal.2d 503, 58 Cal. Rptr. 316,
426 P.2d 884 (1967).

Cal. Rptr. 456 (1966); Leiter v. Eitinge,
246 Cal. App.2d 306, 54 Cal. Rptr. 703
(1966).
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utilities required maintaining their utility lines through plaintiff's property, and the plaintiff would be relegated to the
remedy of damages as in inverse condemnation.
In Franceschi v. Kuntz 3 a nonexclusive easement was conveyed to the buyer upon a sale of land and timber rights. The
land and rights were subsequently reconveyed, and thereafter
the timber rights were assigned to a number of successive
assignees. The original seller contended that the easement
was not transferable to the assignees. The court held that
an easement may be granted to anyone entitled to make use
of the dominant estate and that the easement attaches to that
estate. Although the title to the property may not have
passed, the dominant owner may transfer the timber rights
and grant the purchaser of those timber rights the easement
of access.
In a different vein, upon a partition of land, it was held
in Worchester v. Worchester 4 that an easement may not be
attached to land other than that being partitioned unless
there is an agreement to the contrary. It makes no difference
that the land to which the easement is made appurtenant
belonged to one of the parties to the action; it must be part
of the land partitioned.
In conclusion, an example of the proposition that much
litigation leads to strange results is First & C Corporation v.
W encke. 5 An action by a successor vendee against the vendor was brought on an agreement giving the vendor possession after the purchase. The court found that the agreement
essentially created an estate at will, and since no rent was
reserved, no rent need be paid. Further, a provision in the
lease provided for the erection of a building by the vendee
and the offer of quarters in the building to the vendor. One
portion of this provision called for a lease to the vendor with
a yearly option to renew for a total of 10 years. Now here
is the bombshell. The court said that this provision violates
3. 253 Cal. App.2d 1138, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 810 (1967).
4. 246 Cal. App.2d 56, 54 Cal. Rptr.
436 (1966).

5. 253 Cal. App.2d 805, 61 Cal. Rptr.
531 (1967).
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the rule against perpetuities and cites Haggerty v. City of
Oakland6 as authority. The court did not even cite Wong v.
DiGrazia,7 nor did it state that a reasonable interpretation
of the instrument at bar would, as a matter of law, be one
that could not be performed within a reasonable time. Perhaps this is an application of the old saw "small cases make
bad law."
6. 161 Cal. App.2d 407, 326 P.2d
957, 66 AL.R.2d 718 (1958).
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7. 60 Cal.2d 525, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241,
386 P.2d 817 (1963).
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